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                                                                                                                               1 Introduction 
Legal philosophers do useful work when they make it possible for us to conceptualise law as 
a system.  Hans Kelsen and Herbert Hart do this in their respective accounts of a legal system 
as a hierarchy of norms.  Kelsen also makes the claim that the hierarchy he describes 
constitutes the state.1  Here, Kelsen presents a picture of the state as a normative space.  His 
analysis thus intersects with that of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) in On the 
State.2  For Bourdieu describes the state as a space or field.  But alongside this point of 
intersection between their respective analyses, we must set a striking point of difference.  
Kelsen’s account of law is highly schematic and acontextual.  We find ourselves 
contemplating a hierarchy of norms and the force (legal normativity) that sustains it and 
invests it with practical significance.  Bourdieu’s exposition is more concrete and presents the 
state as a contingent field of forces.  This reflects, among other things, his interest in the 
history out of which the state (in its modern form) has emerged.  The upshot is an analysis 
that complements the work of legal philosophers such as Kelsen.  This is because it conveys a 
vivid sense of the texture of lived experience in the normative space in which Bourdieu, 
Kelsen, and many others share an interest. 
Both the state as a normative space and the activity that unfolds in this context provide 
accessible entry points to Bourdieu’s analysis.  Hence, we will begin with these matters 
before focusing on a feature of his exposition that illustrates its usefulness as an adjunct to 
jurisprudential contributions such as those of Kelsen.  This is its ready applicability to 
operations of the state that have not attracted close jurisprudential attention.  To this end, we 
will apply Bourdieu’s thinking to an institution that bulks large in the practical life of 
English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom: the public 
inquiry.  This is an institution to which Bourdieu’s emphasis on the practical forces that 
manifest themselves in the modern state’s ‘beginnings’ has relevance (46).  As we will see, 
these forces also loom into prominence as the state strives to counter the threat to its 
legitimacy regularly posed by the issues that public inquiries address.  Here, we can find 
support in Bourdieu for the proposition that ‘the passionate task of the state [is] to hold on’ to 
its position of social primacy.3  
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More broadly, we will dwell on a feature of On the State that makes apparent its 
interdisciplinary orientation.  This is Bourdieu’s interest in the legal, political, and economic 
impulses that find expression in the state’s operations.  This is an aspect of his exposition that 
we will explore by reference to the concept of politeia (which identifies law, politics, and 
their economic underpinnings as means to the end of community).  As well as exploring these 
matters, we will bring into focus a surprising feature of a text that is the work of a sociologist 
who dwells on the often grubby character of social reality.4  This is the presence in On the 
State of strands of argument that have affinities with the political philosophy of G.W.F 
Hegel.   
                                                                                                                2 Bourdieu on the State 
Bourdieu argues that if we are to understand the ‘field’ that features in his exposition, we 
must attend to the behaviour of those who bring it into existence (20).  Bourdieu categorises 
the members of this group as ‘law prophets’ or ‘ethical prophets’ (terms he takes from Max 
Weber).5  He identifies these law prophets as engaging in speech-acts that breathe life into the 
state as an impersonal institution that stands apart from those who participate in its 
operations.  The speech-acts to which Bourdieu refers involve the use of the rhetorical device 
of prosopopoeia.  To use this device successfully is to bring an ‘object’ into existence by 
‘speaking in its name’ (45).  Bourdieu does not, however, suggest that the law prophets he 
describes are able to usher the state into existence simply by making reference to it.  Rather, 
he has in mind a more complex process that intersects with John Searle’s writings on the 
construction of social reality.6  This is because the law prophets who feature in Bourdieu’s 
exposition invoke not merely an institution (the state-in-the-making) but the community who 
will make it a practical reality by accepting its existence.  This becomes apparent when 
Bourdieu describes the law prophets as ‘speak[ing] in the name of an ensemble’ that becomes 
a reality (and source of an institution-sustaining ‘consensus’) as a result of the declarations 
they make (10 and 45). 
Bourdieu’s mention of an ‘ensemble’, in whose name the law prophets speak, alerts us to a 
crucial feature of his analysis.  Drawing on Weber, he tells us that the law prophets are ‘the 
founders of a discourse designed to be unanimously recognised as the unanimous expression 
of [a] unanimous group’ (45).  As a result of speaking in this way, they present their audience 
with a discourse that is at least incipiently egalitarian in orientation.  For they seek to secure 
unanimous endorsement by making declarations that will elicit a positive response from their 
audience (the collectivity whose lives the state orders).  The egalitarianism at work in the 
discourse Bourdieu describes is also apparent in the object to which it relates: the state.  For 
the state is, on Bourdieu’s account, an ‘organised fiduciary’ (36-37).  By this he means that 
its purpose is to secure the interests of all those who live within the space it constitutes. 
Bourdieu roots his exposition in French history.  He identifies the law prophets to whom he 
refers as a group of twelfth-century canon lawyers and argues that they ‘invented the modern 
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state’ (46).  Bourdieu adds that a prominent feature of the context in which they did this was 
a rich fund of ‘capital’.  This capital took three principal forms: economic, ‘physical force’ 
(or military), and symbolic (197-198).  In the context where the law prophets successfully 
made their declarations, there was clearly sufficient economic capital in existence to make the 
state a sustainable project.  Likewise, there was sufficient physical force available to the state 
to enable those who wielded the levers of power to maintain the integrity of its borders and to 
levy taxes.  While capital in each of these forms is a necessary condition of the state’s 
existence, Bourdieu identifies symbolic capital as the ‘foundation’ on which it rests (203).  
He tells us that symbolic capital has the power to draw those exposed to it into an ‘order of 
faith, obedience, [and] submission’ (202).  The law prophets who breathed life into the 
modern state possessed symbolic capital in the form of technical competence and a grasp of 
the requirements of impersonal governance.  Hence, they were able to engender in those to 
whom they made their declarations belief in the legitimacy of the practical arrangements they 
put in place.  Bourdieu also describes the law prophets who feature in his account of the 
state’s emergence and development as the possessors of ‘noblesse de robe’ (218).  By 
‘noblesse de robe’ he means a commitment, on the law prophets’ part, to secure the interests 
of the collectivity in whose name they speak. 
These points prompt Bourdieu to describe the modern state as giving expression to ‘the 
properly political’ (255).  While he says that he ‘will not be able to explain’ what he means 
by the ‘properly political’, he clearly has in mind impersonal, egalitarian practical 
arrangements (255).  This becomes apparent in his account of the role that lawyers play in the 
pursuit of the properly political.  Bourdieu says of lawyers that their ‘particular capacity’ is to 
give reasons (270).  He adds that this capacity makes it possible for them ‘to bring things 
from the order of fact – “that’s how it is”, “that’s not possible” … - to the order of reason’ 
(270).  By this he means that they engage in a ‘process of transmutation’ (306).  They do this 
by identifying those considerations that serve the ends of the state.  This involves them in 
interrogating practical matters from a standpoint that is responsive to the requirements of ‘the 
properly political’.  And in their responsiveness to these requirements, lawyers play a central 
role in the construction of the modern state.  Consequently, they become ‘the driving force of 
the universal’ (270).  Moreover, in going about their business in this way, lawyers reveal the 
state to possess ‘meta-capital’: power over capital in its simple forms (e.g., economic 
capital).7  
As well as offering an account of the state’s emergence, Bourdieu argues that we should 
regard it as a ‘field’.  This brings us to an ambiguity in his exposition.  At an early point in 
On the State, he offers a general definition of a field according to which it is ‘a space 
structured according to oppositions linked to specific forms of capital with differing interests’ 
(20).  This definition presents fields as contexts fraught with tension.  However, Bourdieu’s 
account of the state as a field suggests something more integrated.  For he says of the state 
that the space it constitutes is ‘unified theoretically and homogenized by the act of 
construction’ (214).  Within this space, we find more particular spaces that are variously 
legal, political, economic, etc.  Thus the state is ‘a space of spaces, a field of fields’ (233).  
While Bourdieu presents us with these discrete spaces within the larger whole, he also says 
that the state accommodates what he calls ‘the field of power’ (197).  This is a place where 
the possessors of capital (in its particular forms) ‘confront one another’ (197).  He adds that 
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their confrontations concern, among other things, ‘the rate of exchange between different 
species of capital’ (197).  While this is a spur to reflection, Bourdieu fails to describe in clear 
terms how the political, the legal, the economic, etc, complement one another in ways that 
sustain the state.  Thus we are left with no more than the vague sense that they work in 
tandem.   
While vagueness afflicts this aspect of Bourdieu’s exposition, he sounds a definite note on 
what he calls ‘the double face of the state’ (220).  He tells us that the state’s two faces are 
‘integration’ and ‘domination’ (222).  He also advances the ‘thesis’ that ‘integration … is the 
condition for domination’ (222).  Insofar as the state promises ‘progress towards a higher 
degree of universalization’, it is an integrative and egalitarian force (222).  But the state 
pursues the end of integration in ways that reveal it to be a dominant force.  As it 
encompasses particular fields, it engages in ‘a process of establishing a unified and 
homogeneous space, such that all points of the space may be located in relation to one 
another and to the centre’ (223).  Bourdieu also dwells on the state’s impact on individuals.  
Here, he makes an approving reference to Thomas Bernhard’s’ ‘fearful sentence’ that ‘[m]an 
today is only a state man’.8  Bernhard’s statement has obvious relevance to a prominent 
theme not just in On the State but throughout Bourdieu’s work.  This is that objective 
circumstances shape the subjectivity of individuals – fostering in them ‘a practical sense’ that 
finds expression in ‘a feel for the game’ in particular contexts (241).  Bourdieu uses the term 
‘habitus’ when referring to what he calls the ‘objectivity of the subjective’.9  Moreover, he 
offers an account of the influence of habitus that has obvious relevance to law.  He says of 
the people who inhabit the spaces he describes that they act ‘under structural constraint’ 
(137).  By this he means that they have to act in ways that conform to the ‘implicit 
philosophy’ (or ‘logic’) that invests each of these spaces with its distinctive character (45).  
As well as offering this account of the relationship between context and action, Bourdieu has 
much to say on the positions that people and institutions stake out in the spaces he describes.  
This is an aspect of his exposition that has great explanatory power in legal contexts.  Among 
other things, he draws a contrast between the positions that become a feature of practical life 
(e.g., a legal norm) and the unrealised possibilities that sit alongside them.  Bourdieu argues 
that these ‘lateral’ possibilities are apt to slip from view as a viable alternative to what rapidly 
becomes social bedrock.10  He explains this state of affairs by reference to what he calls ‘a 
kind of destiny effect’ (137).  This effect leads people to believe that previously imaginable 
possibilities are ‘dead’ and lends ‘history’ the appearance of a ‘funnel that always tends to 
contract’ (137).  ‘Destiny’ also has relevance to Bourdieu’s account of the universalism and 
particularity of the state in its many national forms.  As we noted earlier, Bourdieu identifies 
the state as egalitarian (insofar as it seeks to secure the interests of all citizens).  But while the 
state’s most obvious egalitarian concerns are particular (national), he argues that its 
aspirations are universal.  Bourdieu illustrates this point by reference to France, noting that 
since 1789, the French state has claimed to serve not just national but universal interests.  He 
finds the same admixture (differently instantiated) in, for example, the communist regimes of 
the Twentieth Century.  In the light of these points, he draws the conclusion that we find 
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more than universalism and particularism in the state.  We also find ‘the imperialism of the 
universal’: the state’s ambition to inscribe its agenda on the wider world (159). 
Bourdieu observes that, whether one is focusing on France, the USA, or any other state with 
the same imperialistic aspirations, it is easy to be ‘critical’ (160).  But he immediately adds 
that ‘[t]hings would be very easy if the imperialism of the universal did not contain at least a 
little bit of what it says and believes itself to be’ (160).  Regrettably, Bourdieu does not 
develop this point.  However, to the extent that he suggests that the ‘imperialism of the 
universal’ promises – if only ‘a little bit’ – to deliver on its large egalitarian promises, he 
sounds (albeit, mutedly) a note reminiscent of Hegel.  For Hegel believed that reason is ‘the 
rose in the cross of the present’.11 This gnomic phrase gives expression to Hegel’s belief that 
a metaphysic of progress is at work in history.12  More concretely, it gives expression to the 
assumption that, while social institutions may be far from perfect, they provide clues as to 
how to move towards the egalitarian ideal of abstract right (Recht).  This ideal enjoins those 
who embrace it to establish practices and institutions that justly accommodate the interests of 
all members of society.  Hence, we find in Recht an unalloyed commitment to the 
universalism that Bourdieu detects in states with imperialistic ambitions.  But this is not the 
only way in which Bourdieu’s exposition calls Hegel to mind.  His thinking has affinities 
with that of Hegel when he identifies the state-as-fiduciary as shaping ‘the universe of the 
public’, including ‘manners’ and ‘morality’ (52).  Hegel spoke in broadly similar terms.  For 
he identified the state as embodying and sustaining Sittlichkeit: an ethical community in 
which manners and morality (as well as legal, political, and economic institutions and 
practices) are prominent elements.13   
While morality and manners each have to do with behaviour and attitudes that people 
consciously embrace or, at least, acquiesce in, Bourdieu also focuses on a less obvious 
element in their practical outlook.  This is what he calls (following Spinoza) the ‘obsequium’ 
(34).  He describes this as ‘the most fundamental tacit demand of the social order’ (35).  On 
Bourdieu’s account, it takes the form of a ‘constant will’ (385, n 13).  He adds that this 
constant will arises as a result of ‘the constant conditioning through which “the state fashions 
us for its use”’.14  While the obsequium is a less obvious feature of our practical outlook than 
either morality or manners, Bourdieu places emphasis on it.  This is because the ‘constant 
will’ it engenders lends support to his view that the state is ‘a principle of orthodoxy, of 
consensus on the meaning of the world’ (6).  However, he recognises that the ‘field’ he 
describes is regularly the scene of practical difficulties that appear intractable – and in which 
members of society ‘no longer know[ ] what to think’ (45).   
While this is the case, Bourdieu identifies the state as possessing the means to address such 
difficulties.  To this end, it mobilises actors who take on the role of ‘official guarantors of the 
official’ (30).  Bourdieu illustrates this point by reference to the French institution of the state 
commission.  These commissions investigate and issue reports concerning ‘public problems’ 
(24).  On Bourdieu’s analysis, they embody the state as ‘the viewpoint on viewpoints’ (28).  
By this he means that those who participate in commissions demonstrate the state to be 
attentive towards and interested in securing all relevant interests.  Thus they lend plausibility 
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to the view that the state is a ‘fiduciary’.  But while conveying this reassuring impression, 
commissions may stake out positions that mark a departure from earlier practical 
arrangements.  Moreover, they present these positions as ‘official truths’ in which the 
‘totality of society’ recognises itself (28).  In this way, these bodies (and others like them) 
enact ‘the spectacle of universality’ (28).  Bourdieu describes the result of performances such 
as this as ‘the conforming transgression, a transgression within the proper forms’ (47).  He 
adds that such performances enable the group ‘to … ‘sav[e] what is essential, the obsequium, 
that is, the recognition of ultimate values’ (47).  Bourdieu closely scrutinises the abilities of 
those who can deliver performances of this sort.  He includes jurists among their number and 
identifies them as ‘the masters of language’ and ‘poets’ (46-47).  He also states that they have 
the ability to ‘invent within certain limits’ and locates them in the ‘field of power’ (46).  
Moreover, he identifies the members of this group as ready to engage in ‘pious hypocrisy’ 
(by, for example, downplaying departures from the ideals to which the state expresses 
commitment) (47).   
As well as pointing up these features of the state, Bourdieu urges us to pay close attention to 
its ‘beginnings’ (46).  He places emphasis on beginnings since the ‘taken-for-granted’ 
attitude that may later shape people’s understanding of the state has not yet reduced their 
ability to see it clearly (46). However, he adds that, while we should seek to understand the 
state’s beginnings, we must recognise that they are unavailable to us.  Hence, his account of 
the emergence of the impersonal institution he describes is highly speculative.  Thus it comes 
as no surprise to find him reaching back into classical antiquity for relevant writings 
(including those of Tacitus) (255).  Bourdieu also traces Renaissance understandings of the 
‘the constitution’ back to classical antiquity, arguing that it was a ‘Greek invention’ that later 
shaped Roman law (334).  This is a feature of his exposition to which we will return.  But we 
must now probe his account of the state as a field.  
                                                                                                               3 The State as a ‘Field’   
The ‘field’ Bourdieu focuses on most closely is (as we have noted) the modern state.  Hence, 
his concerns intersect with those of legal philosophers who have sought to capture the 
contours of a modern municipal legal system.   Hans Kelsen provides an example of such a 
thinker.  For he identifies the state with a system of law.  Moreover, he describes such a 
system as a hierarchy of norms or norm-tree (Stufenbau) and presents an account of it as a 
normative space or field.15  A broadly similar picture emerges from Herbert Hart’s account of 
law as a system.  Hart follows Kelsen in identifying an assemblage of norms (primary and 
secondary rules) that radiate down and out from the highest-order norm (the rule of 
recognition).16  And he, like Kelsen, identifies the highest-order norm within any such system 
as its test of validity.  In each of these legal thinkers, we also find an emphasis on law’s 
normativity.  Law, on their respective accounts, is a source of authoritative reasons for action.  
However, there are significant differences between Kelsen and Hart on the nature of the 
normativity at work within the fields that law establishes – and these differences have 
relevance to Bourdieu.  Kelsen was emphatic on the point that we should strive to work up a 
‘pure’ theory of law.  For only such a theory enables us to see law as an institution whose 
normativity is always distinct – and, as such, not reducible to other action-guiding reasons 
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(most obviously those that make up morality).17  Hart shared with Kelsen the positivist view 
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality (the separability thesis).18  
However, he took a more catholic view of the forms of normativity that may be at work 
within legal systems.  While focusing on the question of how we should describe a legal 
system, Hart presents an exposition that emphasises the typically strong contingent 
relationship between law and morality.19  Likewise, he identifies the polysemous notion of 
‘policy’ as a consideration relevant to law’s operations.20  Thus Hart, while a proponent of 
the separability thesis, encourages reflection on what we might call normative pluralism in 
actually-existing legal contexts. 
Bourdieu engages with the issue of normativity less precisely than either Hart or Kelsen.  
However, he says much that repays close attention and that supports the view that we should 
categorise him as a normative pluralist.  He speaks of the ‘public reason’ and the ‘public 
morality’ that find expression in the operations of the modern state (256).  Given that he uses 
these phrases in the same passage, we might conclude that he assumes ‘public reason’ to be 
moral in nature.  However, it is far from obvious that this is the case.  Passages in his 
exposition suggest a normativity that is distinct from the fields that the state encompasses.  
Thus we find him referring to ‘a specific logic’ at work within the modern state (255).  More 
particularly, he declares that, as the modern state begins to assume a definite shape, it gives 
expression to the form of normativity that he calls ‘the properly political’.  As we noted 
earlier, he says that he is unable to explain what he means by the ‘properly political’.  
However, when we set his invocation of the properly political in the context of those strands 
of his exposition that are Hegelian in orientation, there are reasons for thinking that the field’s 
normativity is moral.  For the properly political seems to have to do with practical 
arrangements that secure the interests of all relevant people adequately.  If this analysis is 
broadly correct, the properly political concerns the pursuit of distributive justice (the ideal 
according to which we should strive to secure the interests of all members of society 
defensibly).21  These points support the conclusion that Bourdieu, like Hegel, assumes the 
normativity of the state (and more particularly law) to be moral.  However, Bourdieu is less 
wedded to the idea of the state as an engine of moral progress than Hegel.  For he observes 
that those who wield power within it must wrestle with ‘a temptation of regression’ that is 
always present (256).  By this he means that, while the reasons for action yielded by the 
properly political are a progressive force, the impulse to advance particular interests may 
impede the pursuit of distributive justice.     
Bourdieu does not, as we noted earlier, present us with a developed account of law as a 
system.  However, he makes apparent the state’s systematicity when he describes it as 
integrating and dominating the spaces it encompasses.  To the extent that the state operates in 
this way, it impresses on those who inhabit particular fields that it enjoys a position of 
primacy in the social whole.  While this is the case, the agents who act within Bourdieu’s 
‘field of fields’ are able to innovate (by, for example, elaborating a ‘distinct’ Western 
‘inheritance’ with its roots in classical antiquity) (81).  Here, Bourdieu’s concerns intersect 
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with those of legal philosophers who have worked up nuanced accounts of innovation in legal 
contexts.  Unlike Bourdieu, however, legal philosophers have typically focused on rather 
technical processes of elaboration.  This is true, for example, of Ronald Dworkin’s account of 
the specification of legal norms in hard cases.22  Bourdieu offers nothing to set alongside 
analyses of this sort.  However, he has much to say on the lived experience of those who 
participate in or who are affected by processes of legal development.  
                                                                                                     4 Populating Normative Space  
Bourdieu tells us that those who argue for and stake out positions in the spaces he describes 
act ‘under structural constraint’.  They have to be attentive to the fact that the state-as-
fiduciary should act in ways that are ‘properly political’.  This means that the positions they 
propose should express a commitment to an egalitarian philosophy of government.  Such a 
philosophy places those who embrace it under an obligation to take account of and seek to 
secure all relevant interests defensibly.  But while this philosophy is a guide to action, it is 
underdeterminate: i.e., open to range of plausible interpretations.23  This means that while an 
enduring commitment to the properly political is a feature of the field Bourdieu describes, it 
is a site of conflict.  Moreover, there are reasons for thinking that conflict within this field 
may, on occasion, have no obvious stopping point.  This would be the case where, for 
example, two or more positions are incommensurable (resistant to ranking on a common 
scale). 
While Bourdieu’s field is a site of conflict, he offers an account of circumstances in which a 
particular position may become, in the minds of relevant actors, a settled feature of the 
practical scene.  He tells us that this is the case where ‘[t]he realised possibility has a … 
destiny effect’ of the sort we noted earlier.  In such circumstances, the likelihood of conflict 
diminishes because ‘lateral possibilities’ cease to have the appearance of viable alternatives.  
This is an analysis we can explore (and in a number of ways refine) by drawing on the 
political philosophy of Michael Oakeshott.  In his account of the emergence and development 
of the modern European state, Oakeshott argues that those who have wielded power within it 
have given shape to two models of human association.24  The first of these models is ‘civil 
association’.  This model takes the form of a modest rule-governed framework within which 
people enjoy broad freedom to live according to their own lights.25  The second model is 
what Oakeshott calls ‘enterprise association’.  Here, those who wield political and legal 
power use it to pursue a goal or end-state that they consider socially advantageous.  For this 
reason, they use the power at their disposal to co-opt all members of society into their plan 
for social betterment.  This is, on Oakeshott’s account, a context in which the interests of the 
individual are (unlike civil association) under constant threat.26   
As well as describing these two models of human association, Oakeshott argues that neither 
of them has succeeded in driving the other from the practical scene in the European context 
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he describes.27  Thus we might describe the modern European state as having sustained a 
condition of (more or less stable) equipoise as between civil and enterprise association.  If 
equipoise is, indeed, a feature of the context Oakeshott describes, we might identify it as 
sitting between two simpler lateral options: civil association and enterprise association.  
Moreover, we might argue that to embrace one or other of these options, to the exclusion of 
the other, would bring with it at least the possibility of destroying an institutional legacy.  In 
such circumstances, equipoise would cease to be a feature of the practical scene.  One or 
other of the two lateral positions would fill the horizon and exert ‘a kind of destiny effect’.  In 
these circumstances, we might take the view that previously imaginable possibilities are (to 
use Bourdieu’s word) ‘dead’.  But this seems overstated.  For the possibility of equipoise 
would continue to exist.  So too would the possibility of civil association in the context of an 
enterprise association – as would that of enterprise association in a society operating as a civil 
association.  However, if these possibilities remained in a state of abeyance over a lengthy 
period of time, they may become less and less imaginable.   
A recent development in British politico-legal life lends some plausibility to this view.  When 
Britain acceded to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty kept open the possibility of what we now refer to as ‘Brexit’.  
Britain’s sovereign legislature could enact a statute (at some point in the future) that would 
carry the country out of what has become the European Union.28  Such a development would 
involve Parliament in bringing a politico-legal possibility out of abeyance and breathing life 
into it.  However, in the decades following Britain’s accession to the EEC, the prospect of 
such a development became, for many Britons (and Continental Europeans), less and less 
imaginable.  While this was the case, British law stood in a state of gravid arrest: pregnant 
with the possibility of legislation that would bring ‘Brexit’ about.  In 2016, many Britons and 
Continental Europeans expressed shock at the decision (reached in a referendum) to leave the 
European Union.  The vehemence of their reaction gave powerful expression to what 
Bourdieu calls the ‘destiny effect’. 
As well as spurring reflection on law as a system and the adoption of positions within the 
field he describes, Bourdieu’s analysis has relevance to less obvious matters with legal and 
political significance.  This is, for example, true of an institution that has long occupied a 
rather awkward place in Britain’s politico-legal culture, the public inquiry.  
                                            5 The Public Inquiry: ‘an [O]utcrop of [P]ublic Administration’29  
Public inquiries (either statutory or ad hoc) are a ‘conventional response on the part of British 
state to the revelation of a major disaster, accident or scandal’.30   On one account, they 
provide a means of ‘organising …controversy into a form more catholic than litigation and 
less anarchic than street fighting’.31  But pinning down their position in the politico-legal 
context of which they are a part is no easy matter.  A former Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Thomas, has described these bodies as ‘a firmly established aspect of [the UK’s] 
                                                          
27 Ibid, 312-13. 
28 N. Duxbury, Viscount Kilmuir: A Vignette (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), 113 (on what Viscount Kilmuir 
LC called ‘the liberty to repeal’). 
29 L. Blom-Cooper, ‘What Went Wrong on Bloody Sunday: A Critique of the Saville Inquiry’ [2010] Public 
Law 61, 64. 
30 R. Dingwall, ‘The Jasmine Beckford Affair’ (1986) 49 Modern LR 489, 489. 
31 S. Sedley, ‘Public Inquiries: A Cure or a Disease?’ (1989) 52 Modern LR 469, 472.  
constitutional practice’.32  While this is true, the proceedings of a public inquiry are not 
‘legal’.33  Thus, while they are instruments of political and social management, they form an 
institutional ‘outcrop’ that resists precise classification.  Nonetheless, it is possible to describe 
the work they do in straightforward terms.  Public inquiries seek to establish the facts relating 
to matters of ‘public concern’.34  They also make recommendations.  This means that they 
often stake out positions that, while not a reform agenda, point the way towards improved 
practical arrangements.   
These points present the public inquiry in a benign light.  For this institution exists to gather 
information as a basis on which to learn lessons that will redound to the benefit of the public 
and thus restore confidence in the state.  However, when we set the public inquiry in the 
context of its own history, it takes on an equivocal appearance.  On many occasions, public 
inquiries have published reports that have prompted critics to throw the brickbat ‘whitewash’ 
at their authors.35  On these occasions, the view has gained currency that the central purpose 
of the public inquiry is not to address practical problems in constructive ways but, rather, to 
still criticism.36  But we must set alongside responses of this sort the fact that government has 
sought to ensure that public inquiries operate in ways that respond effectively to matters of 
public concern.  In 2005, Tony Blair’s New Labour administration made the most recent 
effort to do this.  The Inquiries Act 2005 confers on ministers the power to establish public 
inquiries and places emphasis on ‘the requirement of impartiality’.37   
While Bourdieu does not examine British public inquiries in On The State, he does, as we 
noted earlier, devote close attention to French state commissions.  Much of what he says has 
ready applicability to public inquiries.  He describes state commissions as ‘stagings’ (25).  By 
this he means that they are ‘operations’ that involve a group of people in ‘play[ing] out a kind 
of public drama, the drama of reflection on public problems’ (25).  But while he makes this 
point, Bourdieu is at pains to emphasise that it is not his aim to offer a reductive ‘theatrical 
view’ of the work done by state commissions (25).  He recognises the difficulty of the work 
that those who engage in these ‘stagings’ undertake.  On his account, the state commission 
often finds itself having to address questions that do not yield clear answers (e.g., because of 
‘antinomies’ between competing values) (30).  This leads him to argue that the public 
commission presents challenges of a sort that call for the skills of the ‘law prophet’.  For the 
‘law prophet’ is able to combine ‘the benefits of conformity to the official with those of 
transgression’ (46).  He or she is thus able to transgress the official while preserving what is 
socially essential: the obsequium (47).  Moreover, the law prophet can do this in 
circumstances where ‘no one knows what to think’ (30). 
These features of Bourdieu’s exposition, and his notion of an ‘implicit philosophy, provide a 
basis on which to relate his thinking to the work done by public inquiries in Britain.  In 
Britain, an implicit philosophy to which we can apply the label ‘welfare consequentialism’ 
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has long exerted influence over the state’s operations.38  This philosophy has to do with the 
pursuit of generally – but not universally – beneficial outcomes.39  If we take the view that 
human errors are inevitable in the social systems that government establishes, this philosophy 
makes sense as a guide to action.40  However, in a strongly egalitarian context such as 
Britain, the influence that this philosophy exerts is problematic.  For the state (in its role as 
fiduciary) holds itself out as seeking to secure the interests of all members of society.  
Welfare consequentialism recognises that this may not be possible.  Moreover, so pervasive 
is its influence that it has become more a species of ‘prosaic sanity’ than a philosophy.41  
Hence, when a public inquiry’s investigations throw light on the state’s welfare 
consequentialist character, the person who leads it must seek to close the gap between general 
and universal benefit.  To this end, he or she stakes out positions that point in the direction of 
benign change (lessons that public bodies can learn, more intense regulation, etc).42   
While public inquiries often succeed in conveying the impression that they will spur 
processes of reform, the assumption that this will happen is often questionable.  This is not 
because those who lead them are duplicitous.  Rather, it is because they regularly grapple 
with forms of social activity and institutional arrangements where harmful outcomes are, for 
the reasons we considered earlier, inevitable.  But if a public inquiry is to convey the 
impression that change is in prospect, the person leading it must go about his or her business 
with assurance.  In this context, ‘assurance’ is not reducible to a display of technical prowess.  
It also embraces the capacity to engender confidence in those who participate in the inquiry’s 
operations and ultimately in the consumers of the report it produces.  Much can go wrong in 
the course of seeking to elicit such responses.  The inquiry may find itself addressing an 
inordinately broad range of considerations.  The issues it addresses may be a standing 
invitation to meditate on the culpability of individuals rather than address institutional and/or 
systemic matters.43  And a lack of grip on relevant law and other significant detail may erode 
the inquiry chair’s authority.  These are points that we must bear in mind when we consider 
the relevance of Bourdieu’s law prophet to the operations of a public inquiry.  While 
Bourdieu does not hold this figure out as an ideal, he does present us with an individual who 
has the capacity to make constructive responses to the problems that such a body faces.  
Moreover, the law prophet (as a possessor of noblesse de robe) may be able to act in ways 
that add to the state’s stock of symbolic capital. 
These points throw light not just on the effectiveness of public inquiries as ‘stagings’ but also 
on their failings.  Two examples will serve to illustrate this point.  In 1998, Tony Blair’s New 
Labour government established the Saville Inquiry to investigate the ‘Bloody Sunday’ 
shootings of January 1972 (during which British troops, in Northern Ireland, shot twenty-
eight unarmed civilians, of whom fourteen died).  This inquiry attracted criticism on a variety 
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of grounds, including an undue emphasis on questions of individual culpability rather than 
systemic or institutional failure.  More recently, the third chair of Britain’s Inquiry into child 
sex abuse, Dame Lowell Goddard, resigned from her position following what some reports 
described as a ‘terminal’ loss of confidence in her effectiveness.44  Bourdieu provides a basis 
on which to explain why inquiries such as these cause widespread concern.  They present us 
with performances (or ‘stagings’) that threaten to unravel.  Performances of this type are an 
ever present danger in the context of a public inquiry.  The task is fraught with difficulty.  
This would be the case, where an inquiry has to wrestle with the tensions that arise between 
the pursuit of universal benefits (e.g., in health care delivery) and a welfare consequentialist 
modus operandi.  If the performance is less than assured, the inquiry may attract criticism on 
grounds of ‘pious hypocrisy’.  In such circumstances, the obsequium (the bottom-line of 
politico-legal order) could come under strain.   
While alerting us to this possibility, Bourdieu emphasises the state’s capacity to endure.  This 
capacity is embodied in the law-prophets he describes.  However, its most potent resource is 
meta-capital in the form of the state’s commitment to the properly political.  To this resource 
we must add a broad base of expertise (legal, political, and economic) that facilitates the 
pursuit of the properly political.  Given the prominence of legal, political, and economic 
considerations in Bourdieu’s account of the state’s operations, it seems worth examining their 
relationship more closely.  To this end, we will use the concept of politeia.   
                                                                                                                                      6 Politeia 
Politeia (a concept fashioned by the ancient Greeks) refers to a context in which legal and 
political practices work in tandem in ways that give expression to and sustain the life of a 
community.45  The presence of this concept in the practical life of ancient Greece reveals 
those who made use of it to have been thinking in ways that we can describe as ‘politico-
legal’.  However, when we examine the works of, inter alios, Plato and Aristotle, there are 
reasons for thinking that politeia is not reducible to law and politics.  In The Republic, Plato 
assumes a community that is able to sustain itself.  In making this assumption, he stakes out a 
position on community that encompasses economic, as well as legal and political, 
considerations.46  A broadly similar (if less obvious) assumption informs Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.  For human flourishing (eudaimonia) as he describes it cannot proceed 
in a vacuum.  Along with law and politics, economic activity forms part of, and plays a part 
in sustaining, the context in which eudaimonia takes on the appearance of an eligible ideal.47 
Politeia as it features in ancient Greek philosophy thus emerges as an admixture of political, 
legal, and economic considerations.  To the extent that this understanding of politieia is 
correct, Bourdieu’s concerns intersect more extensively with those of ancient philosophy than 
he seems to have recognised.  For we find in his account of the state as a ‘field’ the same 
admixture of political, legal, and economic considerations and, likewise, the impulse to bring 
them into a fruitful relationship.  While this is the case, Bourdieu gives more emphasis to 
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economic considerations than do Plato and Aristotle.  This emphasis on the economic 
(alongside the political and the legal) is anything but surprising when we view it in light of 
his introduction of the category of ‘the properly political’.  For this category has to do with 
the effective pursuit of ends that are not simply egalitarian but emancipatory – and wealth 
creation is a necessary condition of emancipation on the model that appears to inform 
Bourdieu’s thinking.  Thus we find him placing emphasis on ‘the economic conditions of 
access to the rights of the citizen’ (358).   
These points raise questions about the relationship between law, politics, and economics on 
which Bourdieu, while suggestive, could have been more illuminating.  We can explore these 
questions by drawing on Twentieth Century British jurisprudence, political philosophy, and 
economic thought.  As we noted earlier, Herbert Hart, like Bourdieu, presents us with an 
account of normative space in the form of his analysis of a legal system as a union of primary 
and secondary rules.  However, Hart’s account of the activity that unfolds in this space is 
spare.  We can supplement it by returning to Oakeshott on civil and enterprise association.  
The legal context Hart describes can accommodate either of these models of human 
association or some congeries of the two.  We can add further complexity to the context we 
are contemplating by drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s account of value pluralism.48  Among other 
things, Berlin enables us to argue that civil association attaches importance to freedom of 
action (or liberty) while enterprise association on a welfarist model identifies security as a 
matter of pressing practical concern.   
Illuminating as the respective contributions of Hart, Oakeshott, and Berlin are, they throw 
little light on economic life within the space we are contemplating.  This is a task to which 
John Maynard Keynes’ writings (most obviously, his General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money) have relevance.  Keynes saw economics (his central area of expertise) as 
part of a larger institutional whole.  This is apparent in his account of what he called ‘the 
political problem of mankind’.  On his account, this problem involves the effort ‘to combine 
three things: economic efficiency, social justice, and individual liberty’.49  Moreover, he 
recognised that law, politics, and economics afford means by which to respond constructively 
to this problem - with democratic political institutions exercising ‘central authority’ by legal 
means in pursuit of benign economic outcomes.50  More particularly, Keynes fashioned a 
range of tools that had the purpose of fostering a humane (because economically buoyant and 
egalitarian) model of human association in spaces of the sort Hart describes.  ‘Demand 
management’ was one such tool.  In circumstances where economic depression and a high 
rate of unemployment afflicted society, Keynes argued that government should use taxation, 
interest rates, and public expenditure to stimulate growth.  A welfarist agenda informed this 
macro-economic strategy: to create employment opportunities.51  More generally, Keynes 
argued that all economic strategies should serve the end of a ‘good life’.52  This is an end that 
intersects with Bourdieu’s understanding of the properly political since it is not merely 
egalitarian but emancipatory.  
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When we draw the respective contributions of Hart, Oakeshott, Berlin, and Keynes together, 
we find ourselves contemplating a politico-legal-cum-economic admixture.  ‘Politeia’ gives 
us a convenient shorthand term for this complex whole, and Bourdieu’s interest in it is plain 
to see.  It is apparent when, for example, he argues that lawyers (while being ‘the driving 
force of the universal’) exercise ‘disproportionate influence’ in the construction of the 
modern state (270 and 331).  In support of this point, he identifies them as exercising ‘power 
by way of words’ (331).  For their ability ‘to bring things from the order of fact … to the 
order of reason [or social value]’ makes them the gatekeepers of an order with egalitarian 
aspirations.  This is a point Bourdieu could have made more powerfully with apt examples.  
He might have done this by, for example, considering circumstances in which judges develop 
the law in ways that give individuals access to educational opportunities and thus bolster the 
state’s claims to be distributively just.53  While open to criticism of this sort, Bourdieu 
nonetheless makes an important point about lawyers as gatekeepers.  Moreover, it is a point 
that gains strength when we relate it to his account of the state as an engine of integration and 
domination.  Lawyers play a part in the process of integration when they identify norms, 
arguments, goods, and other considerations that pass muster as ‘properly political’.  When 
they go about their business in this way, they pick out considerations (legal, political, 
economic, etc) that have instrumental value in the context they are fashioning.  Bourdieu’s 
decision to emphasise this aspect of the work lawyers do also makes it possible for him to 
forge a tight link between their ‘disproportionate influence’ and the ‘domination’ of the state.   
While this is the case, talk of ‘domination’ seems overstated.  For the considerations that the 
state embraces become components in a project that is not merely egalitarian but 
emancipatory.  ‘The properly political’ state is a context in which people have some prospect 
of living freely.  Moreover, the process of institutional development that features in 
Bourdieu’s exposition tells the story of efforts to raise the probability of this being the case.  
However, we must set against this point in the modern state’s favour what Bourdieu has to 
say about the imperialism of the universal.  A state of the sort he describes offers a particular 
route to the universal.  The particularity to which Bourdieu draws attention reflects the fact 
that the state, while being informed by a commitment to the ‘properly political’, is a site of 
struggle.  Actors mobilise the capital (legal, political, economic, etc) at their disposal with the 
aim of advancing a particular agenda.  Bourdieu illustrates this point when he describes the 
jurists responsible for the modern state’s emergence and development as simultaneously 
promoting ‘the idea of universalism’ and ‘juridical competence’ (a particular form of capital) 
(267 and 343).  By emphasising the practical significance of the capital in their possession, 
they underwrite their place in the context that they play a central role in fashioning.  This 
point throws light on the practical outlook internal to Bourdieu’s field of fields.  This 
standpoint places those who take it up under obligations to exhibit fidelity towards the state’s 
core normative commitment: the pursuit of the properly political.  However, the properly 
political is, as we noted earlier, underdeterminate.  Thus it is possible to meet its requirements 
in a range of defensible ways.  For situated actors (in possession of particular forms of 
capital), the most obvious way to do this is to make use of the capital in their possession in 
the contexts where they find themselves.   
This is a point we can explore by relating Bourdieu’s thinking on the specification of 
positions in normative space to Ronald Dworkin’s account of the way in which judges should 
                                                          
53 See, for example, Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954). 
decide hard cases.  Dworkin makes his response to this issue vivid by introducing a fictive 
(and idealised) judge, Hercules J.  Hercules attends to ‘institutional history’ with the aim of 
drawing authoritative reasons for action from the politico-legal system and tradition in which 
he works.54  Dworkin adds that Hercules extracts a ‘background morality’ from this context.55  
Moreover, he uses this morality to make sense of the various legal norms and other 
considerations (rules, principles, policies, etc) relevant to the cases he must decide.  Hercules 
finds in this background morality a basis on which to work up what Dworkin calls ‘the 
soundest theory of law’.56  Dworkin tells us that such a theory affords a basis on which to 
ascribe due significance or weight to the various considerations relevant to the disputes that 
he must resolve. 
On Dworkin’s account, the responses that Hercules J makes to hard cases are a consummate 
professional performance.  He responds impartially to each of the sources of normative 
pressure (rights, principles, policies, institutional history, and background morality) that bear 
on the decisions he must make. But at this point, Bourdieu might object that Dworkin has 
missed matters that we cannot afford to ignore.  Bourdieu might argue that when Hercules 
adverts to institutional history, he enters (at least in his imagination) the field of power.  This 
is a context that (on our earlier analysis) we can only understand from a pluralist normative 
standpoint: i.e., a viewpoint that finds in law, politics and economics distinct reasons for 
action.  To an argument along these lines Bourdieu might add the further point that Hercules 
J’s investment in law (a distinct form of capital) limits his attentiveness to many of the 
impulses at work in this space.  Moreover, he could find support for this point in Hercules J’s 
efforts to extract from (pluralist) institutional history what Dworkin calls the soundest theory 
of law.  Dworkin might respond to such an argument by pointing out that Hercules J’s 
institutional role requires him to act in precisely this way.  There seems to be no basis on 
which to gainsay this point.  Nonetheless, Bourdieu gives us grounds for thinking that a 
significant element of particularity (rooted in the possession of certain sorts of capital) may 
play a part in the specification of positions in normative space.  Moreover, his talk of 
‘imperialism’ has relevance not just to power struggles within but beyond the borders of a 
particular state.  This is a point we can develop by reference to a critique of Dworkin offered 
by the political philosopher, John Gray.  On Gray’s analysis, Dworkin seeks to judicialise 
politics by arguing for the practice of constitutional judicial review on the model we find in 
the USA.57  Gray also criticises Dworkin for making the large assumption that judges in other 
jurisdictions (e.g., the United Kingdom) should adopt judicial review on the model he 
favours.58     
Aside from its imperialistic tendencies, particularity of the sort Gray finds in Dworkin may 
pose a threat to the pursuit of the properly political.  This is because it may encourage the 
possessor of one form of capital to adopt a chary or dismissive attitude towards those who 
can mobilise it in other forms.  Consider Keynes.  On any reckoning, Keynes was a denizen 
of the field of power.  Moreover, he regularly occupied roles in which government entrusted 
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him with the state’s meta-capital (e.g., while working in the Treasury).  The trust government 
reposed in him makes sense in the light not just of his prodigious ability but also of his 
commitment to an egalitarian philosophy of government (or, in Bourdieu’s terms, ‘the 
properly political’).  However, it is easy to find an element of particularity in his thinking.  It 
is apparent in his attitude towards lawyers.  He declared that ‘generally speaking, I do not like 
lawyers’ and complained that they ‘too often … make common sense illegal’.59  Keynes also 
described politicians (at an early point in his career) as ‘awful dregs’.60  In statements such as 
this, Bourdieu might detect a tendency towards ‘regression’ that is always (on his analysis) a 
live possibility in what we have been calling politeia.   
                                                                                                                              7 Conclusions 
Bourdieu’s concerns in On the State clearly intersect with those of lawyers.  As we have 
noted, his account of the state as a field or normative space exhibits similarities to the 
analyses of Kelsen and Hart.  Bourdieu also shares with legal philosophers a keen interest in 
the specification of positions in normative space.  While Bourdieu’s analysis lacks the 
precision that we find in, inter alios, Kelsen, and Hart, he succeeds in populating the field he 
describes in a way that is rare in legal philosophy.  He alerts us, among other things, to the 
way in which universal and more particular concerns bear on and shape the behaviour of 
those who act in the fields he describes (e.g., ‘the temptation of regression’).  Thus we find 
ourselves in the company of cross-pressured agents rather than, say, an idealised judge, such 
as Dworkin’s Hercules J who scrutinises the norms relevant to a hard case from an 
impersonal standpoint.  Lived experience is also very much to the fore when, for example, 
Bourdieu dwells on the ‘destiny effect’ exerted by legal norms that become settled features of 
the space he describes.  
A particular strength of Bourdieu’s exposition is its wide applicability.  This made it possible 
for us to gain analytic purchase on the work done by public inquiries (a tool of governance 
that, while in regular operation in many English-speaking countries, receives surprisingly 
little theoretical attention).  Bourdieu is also a spur to reflection on the forms of normativity 
at work in the spaces he describes.  Given the wide range of these impulses we can classify 
him as a normative pluralist.  However, we should treat this classification with some caution.  
It has clear relevance to Bourdieu the sociologist who, in his efforts to describe what he sees, 
is resistant to the idealisation of institutions.  But what of Bourdieu’s normative position on 
the state?  Here we need to press our analysis further if we are to pin down the position he 
stakes out.  To this end, we explored the affinities between Bourdieu’s thinking on the state 
and that of Hegel.  Among other things, we noted that Bourdieu, like Hegel, contemplates the 
possibility that we may find hints of the universal at work within the actually-existing state.  
Moreover, the law prophets who feature in On the State go about their business in ways that, 
again, call Hegel to mind.  For they seek to turn facts (e.g., features of the practical scene that 
become the stuff of legal, political and economic argument) into values (authoritative 
positions) that give expression to ‘the properly political’ (universal morality).  Here, 
Bourdieu presents us with a deliberative process that looks much like that in Hegel’s account 
of ethical community (Sittlichkeit).  In one further respect, Bourdieu’s thinking is strongly 
reminiscent of Hegel.  Just as politeia enables us to point up the relationship between law, 
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politics, and economics in On the State, so too we can use it to pick out prominent elements 
in Hegel’s wide-ranging account of Sittlichkeit.  Politeia also brings into focus an 
underdeveloped component of the exposition in On the State that, again, savours of Hegel.  
This is its interest in continuities in the Western politico-legal-cum-economic tradition that 
extend over millennia.  
Finally, it seems worth considering how prominent legal positivists such as Kelsen and Hart 
might respond to Bourdieu’s account of the normativity at work within the state.  We might 
expect Kelsen to say that his project is different from that of Bourdieu since he focuses on 
law’s distinctive normativity and is thus a monist, not a pluralist.  However, we might expect 
a rather different response from Hart.  In ‘The Postscript’ to The Concept of Law, Hart 
entertained doubts about the separability thesis.  Moreover, had he had the resolution to act 
on these doubts, they might have carried him in the direction of normative pluralism on a 
model not unlike Bourdieu.  Thus it seems likely that he would have been attentive to 
Bourdieu’s analysis.  Hart would doubtless have been uneasy about Bourdieu’s readiness to 
entertain the possibility that ‘a little bit’ of ‘the universal’ may be at work within actually-
existing law.  In Hart’s ears, talk of ‘the universal’ would have had a troublingly 
metaphysical ring (as would a Hegelian understanding of the properly political).  However, 
Bourdieu is amenable to a more earth-bound reading.  He invites us to attend to the bundle of 
practical impulses that we have placed under the heading of politeia.  Likewise, he 
encourages reflection on ‘the space of spaces’ in which we seek to bring them into a socially 
useful relationship.  Thinking along these lines may prove more fruitful than getting hung up 
on the hint of Hegel that we have detected in Bourdieu or, for that matter, on the separability 
thesis.     
 
